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175 * 177 where Terêna local groups were involved through the local
648 "colonels," who invaded and robbed their aldeas.

* 177 After the Estado Novo, with the re-establishment of
● 666 democratic life in the country, the political parties began to
648 seek out the Terêna aldeas with the aim of gaining electors among those who might perchance know how to sign their names. To the Indian this meant, on the one hand, more symmetrical relations with the "civilizado," at least while the election propaganda lasted; on the other hand, he would get at that time a few gifts and a voucher (which on October 3, 1955 was worth 130 cruzeiros) if he voted for a specific candidate. It is not irrelevant to point out that this voucher had to be collected in goods, at the store of the candidate or of someone in his party, thus making even more insignificant the amount with which the votes were purchased.

In 1955, till the eve of the elections, there were 39 electors (including nine women) in one of the aldeas alone, namely Cachoeirinha. In Passarinho, Moreira, and União, taken together, the number of electors could not have reached
123 50. In the other aldeas, unfortunately, we were unable to find
* 177 out the numbers of electors, because the news was afoot that
666 the Serviço de Proteção aos Índios, on account of the partisan
648 activities of some of the post superintendents in canvassing electors in previous elections, had decided to withdraw the Indians' /voting/ certificates. This naturally hampered our work, since at the time we were affiliated with the officials of that department. But it did not prevent us, in Cachoeirinha, a community where we remained for a long time, from making such a survey and from gaining the confidence of the com-
* 177 munity for purposes of political discussion. Probably in all the
666 Terêna aldeas (not to speak of the Guarani ones), the political
648 parties promoted small rallies, some of them authorized by the superintendents, others by their own "captains," who often
/138/ voted against the superintendent's party in an obvious show of antagonism between the community and the Serviço de

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*177 Proteção aos Índios. But the most common technique was to
●666 send trucks to the aldeas to bring the Terêna to the city, where
648 they had to attend large rallies organized there. In Cachoeirinha, for example, we saw the PSD /Partido Social Democrático/ and the PTB /Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro/, parties then united and of the opposition, send trucks to the reservation, which returned full of Indians, electors or not, anxious to take advantage of the free ride to the city of Miranda. When the UDN /União Democrática Nacional/, the party in power, set up its rally, the same Indians would return to the city, under identical conditions, with the sole idea of taking maximum advantage of a recreational opportunity. Political loyalty was proportional to the value of the gifts received and of the promises made to the "captain" or the community leaders.
[622] In other words, it was a matter of winning over the most influential persons in the aldea, especially the "captain," who always had a body of electors loyal to him rather than to the
[466] "Purutuya" parties or candidates. It should be noted that in the community we are dealing with, all the votes (except for one of two) were promised to the party in power, owing to the fact that the prefect of Miranda had showered gifts on the aldea "captain," in spite of being himself the greatest exploiter of native labor, both on his fazenda (next to the reservation) and on his sugar and rum mill (close to the aldeas of Passarinho and Moreira), where he pays wretched wages to his employees, who are all Indians from Passarinho.

*177 The reaction of the detribalized Indians varies in the
666 following way: those who live on fazendas have even less
367 freedom to vote, since they must always follow their master, the fazendeiro (in the political picture, he follows the same path as the neo-Brazilian country people); the urbanized Indians tend to vote for the candidates indicated by the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, claiming that this is the party of workers and that they, as such, cannot but support its candidates.
[829] This shows the rise of a more relevant political consciousness,

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*177 and one more compatible with a democratic system, something
666 that does not happen in the aldeas or on the fazendas, which
369 are still part of a paternalistic structure (each in its own way)
829 and ideologically inconsequent. The fact is that both the aldea Indians and the detribalized ones, on the whole, are led by the activities of the political parties to an awareness of the existence of /139/ a broader structure that compels them to express themselves by means of the vote. Of course, the consciousness of this mechanism varies in the proportion indicated above, with the urbanized Indians in the "more enlightened" [554] position. It is worth mentioning here, to illustrate a change which is taking place in the Terêna situation, the candidacy of one of their most active leaders, the "Believer," Patrício Lily, for a member of the city council of Miranda in the coming elections of October, 1958. (206) There is no doubt that the

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206. This Terêna, in spite of living in a village--and of being classified roughly among the aldea Indians--is one of the exceptions, perhaps the most glaring one, owing to the fact that he is connected with the city to the same extent as the urbanized Indians, as demanded by his profession as a music teacher and an Evangelical leader, whose story we already referred to in Chapter V. (When this work was in press, in final proofs, we learned that the Terêna, Patrício Lily, had given up his candidacy, claiming that he was not a politician, although he had been invited to join various slates of candidates.)

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*177 178 648 The segregated condition to which the aldea population is subjected stimulates the emergence of psycho-social mechanisms that work counter to assimilation: it strengthens the "tribal we," decreases the possibilities of interethnic contact, and marks the position of the Indian socially as a ward. Let us examine this last aspect of segregation, since the first two--the strengthening of tribal consciousness and the creation of obstacles to interethnic contact--were already dealt with in previous chapters. The most flagrant discrimination against the Indian that we had the opportunity to witness bore the approval of the Serviço de Proteção aos Índios at the time of the 1955 elections. In that year, at the end of September, thus on the eve of the elections, the Inspetoria Regional (IR-5) with headquarters in Campo Grande and responsible for the supervision and articulation of the native posts /147/ of southern Mato Grosso, along with the central administration of the Serviço de Proteção aos Índios, decided to withdraw the Indians' voting certificates on the grounds that regional politicking would be prejudicial to the Indians' interests and to their administration. It considered--with some reason--that, if the Indians were to vote, the officials of the Serviço de Proteção aos Índios, especially the superintendents, would eventually become electoral leaders, as had already happened in some aldeas; the result of this would be a future wrangling over the posts of native-post superintendents, since they would come to represent political power, electoral importance. Very well. Such were the reasons that led the Serviço de Proteção aos Índios--through its inspetoria--to take an attitude that clashed with the basic principles of a native policy oriented toward guaranteeing to the Indian the securing of rights he would prove ready to enjoy. Once literate, and in most cases, a reservist, the Indian elector automatically ceased to be a ward (despite the sui generis nature of this wardship)--and the Serviço de Proteção aos Índios, interpreting in a positive way the protectionist policy, would have no other recourse than to insure

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the securing and enjoyment of a right he had won. Let us leave aside, however, the indigenist implications of such an attitude and go on to examine its sociological aspect.

The first measure of the native-post superintendents was to collect the voting certificates in the aldeas themselves. There they managed to collect only part of them, and probably a small part--to judge by Cachoeirinha, where only a few agreed to give up their certificates; a large part of the Indians claimed that their certificates were to be found either at party headquarters (in the city) or in the hands of the electoral magistrate himself, from whom they would have to get them back in order to vote. As a result, some of the superintendents, eager to carry through at any cost the orders of their superiors, went to the cities on election day and tried to prevent the Indians from voting through every possible means. This was a veritable hunt and an extremely difficult task, since while the S. P. I. officials were assisted by one party, they were hindered by another that counted on the votes of the Indians in that particular aldea. Many voted, it is true. Perhaps a majority did, for not all of the officials endeavored to be so efficient.... But the result of this was to make clear to the Indian that the distance between him and the society of the "Pururuya" is practically unbridgeable. And more: to be an Indian /148/ living in an aldea under the sight of the Serviço de Proteção aos Indios, (209) is to suffer discrimination too, which begins with the actions of the very body supposed to protect their rights.

209. The detribalized Indians (urbanized and living on fazendas), as well as those living in aldeas that do not have a native post, were not prevented from voting, since, practically speaking, they were not under the control of the S. P. I.